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UNITED STATES POLICY ON JERUSALEM, 1948
SHLOMO SLONIM*
Jerusalem was a focal point of dispute in the 1947-1948 conflict be-
tween Jews and Arabs over the destiny of Palestine, and American policy
on Jerusalem oscillated between seeking a Solomonic solution and escap-
ing responsibility for the implementation of that solution. Thus, by the
end of 1948, the United States moved from its initial support for territo-
rial internationalization to a position in which it was willing to settle for
practically anything agreeable to the parties, so long as the security of,
and freedom of access to, the Holy Places could be assured.
In January 1947, Great Britain, despairing to bring Jews and Arabs to a
mutual settlement, conveyed the Palestine problem to the United Nations
for resolution. In spring 1947, the United Nations established the Special
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to investigate the problem and pres-
ent its recommendations for consideration at the regular General Assem-
bly session in September.1 By an overwhelming majority, UNSCOP
recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and
the internationalization of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum, to be admin-
istered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council.2 In the ensuing Gen-
eral Assembly debate, the United States endorsed the Partition Plan,
including the scheme for an internationalized Jerusalem.3 The proposal
for a City to be administered under international auspices was fraught
with considerable difficulty with regard to such problems as internal se-
curity, citizenship, financial support, and economic development. The
area to be placed under United Nations control, as UNSCOP proposed,
was extensive-stretching far beyond the municipal boundaries of Jerusa-
lem as defined by the British Mandate. It embraced Motza and Ein
Kerem to the west, Bethlehem to the south, Abu Dis to the east, and
* Professor Shlomo Slonim, LL.B (Melb.), Ph.D. (Col.), holds the James G. McDon-
ald Chair in American History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
1. See G.A. Res. 106 (S-1), U.N. Doc. A/310, at 6 (1947).
2. See G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 131 (1947) (acknowledging receipt of
the Special Committee's recommendation).
3. The United States, along with Sweden, took the initiative in proposing that the
General Assembly accept the basic principles of the UNSCOP majority plan. See The
Question of Palestine, 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 236, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.13 (citing U.N. Doc. A/
AC.14/16).
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Shu'fat to the north. Ostensibly, the proposal was designed to incorpo-
rate other Holy Places, especially those in Bethlehem and Ein Kerem,
within the City's boundaries. According to Jewish Agency officials, how-
ever, the extension of the City's borders was designed to balance and
counterweigh the Jewish population in the City. Jews had constituted the
majority population in Jerusalem for over a century, and it was consid-
ered unwise to subject the Legislative Council to Jewish domination.
With the proposed expansion of the boundaries, the Moslem and Jewish
populations would be more or less equal.4
During the course of the United Nations deliberations, it became clear
that there was considerable sentiment for limiting internationalization to
the Old City.5 This was due primarily to an appreciation of the extraordi-
nary administrative and financial burdens that the United Nations would
face in organizing and running an international metropolis. Limiting the
scope of internationalization to the Old Walled City was one means of
circumscribing the scope of responsibility. The United States was not
averse to this suggestion, no doubt realizing that the ultimate burden-
especially the financial one-likely would fall on its shoulders. However,
the UN committee decided to adhere to the original proposal of an ex-
panded City.6 On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly voted, by
the required two-thirds majority, to adopt the Partition Plan, including
the scheme for the internationalization of Jerusalem.7 The United States,
having played a leading role in formulating the provisions of the partition
resolution, voted with the majority.
At this point, State Department officials began working in two contra-
dictory directions simultaneously. On the one hand, the United States
participated actively in Trusteeship Council discussions in early 1949 to
draft a Jerusalem Statute to administer the City as a corpus separatum.
The task was not a simple one, and the fact that each of the Arab states
vehemently rejected internationalization complicated the matter further.
Indeed, only the Jewish Agency agreed to accept internationalization.
Such details as the appointment of a United Nations Governor and the
formulation of provisions relating to the self-governing institutions, the
judiciary, the organization of the police, and citizenship requirements,
were all matters of considerable sensitivity and entailed extensive debate
4. See MENAHEM KAUFMAN, AMERICA'S JERUSALEM POLICY: 1947-1948, at 8-9
(1982) (discussing the Arab and Jewish population proportions in the international zone).
5. See Shlomo Slonim, The United States and the Status of Jerusalem 1947-1984, 19
ISR. L. REV. 179, 182 (1984).
6. Id.
7. G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 131 (1947); 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1709-30 (1976).
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and negotiation. The United States assumed a major role in drafting
these provisions, and its representative, Benjamin Gerig, served as Chair-
man of the drafting committee. The draft Jerusalem Statute was com-
pleted and ready for submission to the General Assembly in April, 1949.8
On the other hand, there was a strong movement within the State De-
partment to abandon partition completely as an unrealizable proposi-
tion.9 On the morrow of the General Assembly vote, fighting broke out
in Palestine between Jews and Arabs; the Yishuv, the Jewish Community,
was under siege. The Haganah, the Jewish defense force, was unable to
retaliate effectively against Arab attacks for two reasons. First, it lacked
weapons, both light and heavy, to mount a major offensive. Second, be-
cause the British, who still were in control of the area, sided with the
Arabs and intervened to disarm members of the Haganah, it was impossi-
ble to counter the Palestinian Arab attacks significantly. Thus, by Janu-
ary/February 1949, State Department officials were convinced that
partition could not be implemented without intervention from abroad.
The United States was unwilling to contemplate dispatching its own
forces to Palestine to implement partition, because this would arouse
fierce antagonism in the Arab world. Nor was it prepared to countenance
the entry of Soviet bloc forces-something which the continued fighting
in Palestine might readily entail. With the Cold War becoming increas-
ingly menacing-particularly with the crises in Czechoslovakia and Ber-
lin-Washington was deeply concerned to control the Palestine situation
and deny the Soviets a grand opportunity for expansionism in the Middle
East.1" In the view of State Department officials, the only alternative to
partition was an international trusteeship for Palestine which, they be-
lieved, would abate the fighting and help extricate the United States from
8. For a review of the formulation of the draft Statute for Jerusalem, see Questions
Specifically Referred to the Trusteeship Council by the General Assembly, 1947-48 U.N.Y.B.
778, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.13; H. EUGENE Bovis, THE JERUSALEM QUESTION, 1917-1968,
at 48-52 (1971).
9. For further discussion of State Department deviation from the pro-partition line
which President Truman endorsed, see CLARK CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A
MEMOIR ch. 1 (1991); ROBERT J. DONOVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS: THE PRESIDENCY OF
HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1945-1948, at 372-79 (1st ed. 1977). But cf DEAN RUSK, AS I SAW IT
147 (Daniel S. Papp ed., 1st ed. 1990) (discussing President Truman's approval of the State
Department's plan).
10. In a conversation with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on December 5,
1947, Secretary of State George Marshall said that "the greatest fear of the US military
authorities in regard to the question [of implementation of partition] was the presence of a
Russian force in Palestine." See Letter from George Marshall, Secretary of State, to
Lovett, Acting Secretary of State (Dec. 6, 1947), in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 8592, 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1301-02 (1971).
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supporting a highly controversial plan. At an earlier stage, in December
1947, these same State Department officials had succeeded in arranging
the imposition of an arms embargo on the Middle East, thereby hamper-
ing the Jewish defense forces seriously in their attempts to counter the
Arab assault.'1 Arab states continued to receive arms from the British in
accordance with "standing orders," while the Haganah had no outside
sources from which to obtain arms supplies. The imposition of an arms
embargo was at cross purposes with the provision in the partition resolu-
tion which called for the creation of armed militias in the two proposed
states to ensure minimal domestic security. As a prime mover of the par-
tition resolution and a permanent member of the Security Council
(whose function it was to preserve international peace and security), the
United States might have been expected to help furnish the necessary
arms to equip the militias. However, the new trusteeship proposal coin-
cided perfectly with that line of policy which envisaged that only disaster
for the United States could emerge from involvement in the Palestine
question and, therefore, recommended disengagement from the whole
issue.
The first step in the abandonment of partition, as engineered by the
State Department, was the presentation of a legal thesis defining and lim-
iting the scope of the Security Council's powers. On February 24, 1948,
Warren Austin, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, ad-
dressed the Security Council and argued that the Council was precluded
from intervening in the Palestine question to enforce partition, even
though the General Assembly had requested such intervention under the
partition resolution. 12 The Council's powers under the United Nations
Charter, he contended, limited the Security Council to the maintenance
of international peace and security. It was powerless to intervene in a
domestic situation to enforce a plan the General Assembly devised, or
even one devised by the Security Council itself. This legal analysis,
although imperfect, contained a measure of validity. In the particular cir-
cumstances of Palestine in 1948, however, it was quite irrelevant, because,
by then, fighting that constituted a threat to international peace and se-
curity clearly existed. Consequently, even if the Security Council could
not intervene in the conflict to implement partition, it was at liberty, even
obliged, to take steps to extinguish the fighting. This would have enabled
implementation of partition regardless of any legal doctrine restricting
11. See Shlomo Slonim, The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine, 94 POL.
Sci. Q. 495 (1979) (discussing the effects of the 1948 arms embargo and its impact on the
resolution of the Palestine question).
12. U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 253d mtg. at 31, 48, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.253 (1948).
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the powers of the Security Council. But Austin's thesis was merely pre-
liminary to the next demarche: United States' advocacy of complete with-
drawal from the partition scheme.
On March 19, 1948, in an address to the Security Council, Ambassador
Austin announced to a stunned world that the United States was aban-
doning the policy of partition, which it had endorsed barely four months
earlier, in favor of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine.13 The Partition
Plan, he explained, "was an integral plan which would not succeed unless
each of its parts could be carried out. There seems to be general agree-
ment that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means.
14
Consequently, the United States saw no alternative to withdrawal from
the plan. At the same time, Ambassador Austin also emphasized that
after the departure of the British on May 15, the United Nations would
not be responsible for the former Palestine Mandate and would bear no
responsibility for the administration of Jerusalem.15 Thus, in burying par-
tition, the State Department also interred the scheme for the internation-
alization of Jerusalem.
Naturally, Ambassador Austin did not allude to the State Department's
determination to scuttle the plan from the beginning. The imposition of
the arms embargo had seriously compromised any prospect of the Jewish
state surviving the concerted attack launched against it. A New York
Times editorial, dated March 21, 1948, labelled the decision to abandon
partition as "a climax to a series of moves which has seldom been
matched for ineptness in the handling of any international issue by an
American administration."16 It was "a plain and unmistakable surrender
to the threat of force," and held "little promise of being able to avoid the
very hazards which it is intended to circumvent.",
17
But neither the New York Times editor, nor the American people gen-
erally, were aware that President Truman was as surprised as everyone
else by the Austin announcement. Just a day earlier he had met with
Chaim Weismann, former head of the Jewish Agency, and had assured
him that the United States remained committed to the Partition Plan.
The entry in Truman's diary for March 19 reveals the depth of his conster-
13. U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 271st mtg., at 11, 32-33, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.271 (1948).
14. Id. at 31.
15. See id. (stating "[t]he limited functions which the General Assembly offered to
undertake in connection with its Palestine recommendation stand or fall with that
resolution").
16. Editorial, The Switch on Palestine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1948, at D6.
17. Id.
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nation at the trick that the State Department had played upon him.18
Although he had seen an advance copy of the Austin speech, the Presi-
dent had given explicit instructions that nothing should be done to modify
the clear American commitment to partition.19 In his recently published
memoirs, Clark Clifford, President Truman's closest adviser at the time,
charges State Department officials with having done "everything in their
power to prevent, thwart, or delay the President's Palestine policy in 1947
and 1948. ,20
May 15, 1948, the date set for the British departure from Palestine,
ushered in a new state of legal and military affairs. The state of Israel
proclaimed its independence and on the same day five Arab states
launched an invasion to destroy the Jewish state. Partition, as a plan
comprising three parts-an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an internation-
alized Jerusalem- became defunct. The whole plan had disintegrated.
All thought of an internationalized City was abandoned, and the United
Nations took no steps to institute international authority in the City or to
claim a right of administration there. Jerusalem, like the rest of former
Palestine, was one vast battlefield, and a contest of arms would determine
control of the City. In effect, Jerusalem, no less than the whole area of
the former Mandate, was in legal terms a terra nullius, with each combat-
ant gaining control of whatever territory it could seize. The United
States, in line with the legal analysis that its Ambassador presented in the
Security Council, rejected unequivocally the notion that the United Na-
tions had become heir to the League of Nations mandate system. Wash-
ington operated on the assumption that the United Nations technically
was not responsible for either Palestine or Jerusalem in any administra-
tive sense, and it did not seek to promote any United Nations administra-
tion in the area. Furthermore, the United States did not assert that the
United Nations possessed any such administrative authority. On the cru-
cial date of May 15 and the weeks that followed, there was no support for
institution of an international regime in Jerusalem under United Nations
auspices. The City, in fact, became divided between two states, Jordan
18. See Shlomo Slonim, President Truman, the State Department and the Palestine
Question, 34 WEINER LIBR. BULL. 15, 23 (1981) (citing MARGARET TRUMAN, HARRY S.
TRUMAN 424-25 (1972) as reprinting President Truman's diary entry) (quoting President
Truman as writing "[tjhe State Department pulled the rug from under me today").
19. Id. at 15-24.
20. CLIFFORD, supra note 11, at 4. But cf. RUSK, supra note 11, at 147 (noting Presi-
dent Truman's approval of the trusteeship plan). For a discussion of State Department
handling of the Palestine question, see H.W. BRANDS, INSIDE THE COLD WAR: Loy HEN-
DERSON AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 1918-1961, at ch. 12 (1991) (discussing
the "Palestine Labyrinth").
[Vol. 45:813
United States Policy on Jerusalem, 1948
and Israel. United States involvement in the Jerusalem question was
sidetracked.
Meanwhile, the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke
Bernadotte, presented various ideas for resolving the question of Jerusa-
lem, as part of suggested schemes for settling the Arab-Israeli dispute."1
His first plan, presented on June 28, 1948,2 called for the creation of a
union between Jordan and Israel, with the former incorporating the rump
of Palestine into its own territory and also gaining control of the Negeb,
which had been assigned to the Jewish state under the Partition Plan.23
He recommended that Jerusalem also come under Jordanian control and
that the 100,000 Jews in the City be accorded "municipal autonomy., 2 4
Bernadotte's suggestions horrified Israel, and it rejected them immedi-
ately.25 An official reply labelled his Jerusalem proposal "disastrous."
Recognizing that Bernadotte's ideas were unrealistic, the United States
studiously avoided any indication of assent. Bernadotte's first plan
withered on the vine, not only because of its ineptness, but because it
proved unacceptable to all the Arab states except Jordan.
Bernadotte's second plan, issued on September 16, 1948, revived the
original concept of an internationalized Jerusalem.16 It omitted, however,
any reference to a corpus separatum and, in fact, endorsed "maximum
feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities., 27 In this
second plan, Bernadotte likewise eschewed assigning the Trusteeship
Council any role in the administration of the City. While the plan high-
lighted the need for safeguards for the Holy Places, it accorded the two
states actually in control of the City full authority to administer their re-
spective sectors. Given the realities of the situation, a more modest role
for the United Nations was in order, and therefore, the secular affairs of
the City were consigned to the two concerned states. Two days after pub-
21. The General Assembly created the post of United Nations Mediator in Palestine
in 1948. G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/555 (1948).
22. For the text of Bernadotte's suggestions, see U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. 1, July
1948, at 18-21, U.N. Doc. S/863 (1948). Although Bernadotte presented his plan to the two
parties on June 28, 1948, the Secretary-General of the Security Council did not release its
text until July 4, 1948. Id. at 18.
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id.
25. In his memoirs, Abba Eban, then serving as Israel's Ambassador to the United
Nations at the time of Bernadotte's proposal, stated: "Since Jerusalem was the only city in
the Middle East, and indeed in the world, in which Jews had been a majority for three
quarters of a century, the effrontery of this proposal left us breathless." ABBA EBAN, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 124 (1977).
26. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/648 (1948).
27. Id. at 18.
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lication of his plan, Bernadotte was assassinated, and the plan became a
legacy which the British and American governments sought to promote in
the General Assembly. The overall plan, however, was rejected in the
face of Soviet and Arab opposition. The former contended that the Ber-
nadotte plan (even the second one) violated the original partition
scheme, while the latter objected to any plan entailing recognition of the
existence of a Jewish state. Only the Jerusalem clause in the second Ber-
nadotte plan proved acceptable to the General Assembly.28 But this
clause reflected the line favored by the United States-that the United
Nations, in exercising control of the City, should be concerned primarily
with the Holy Places, while leaving the day-to-day administration of the
City to Jordan and Israel. The Assembly resolution postponed final de-
termination of the Jerusalem question to the next General Assembly ses-
sion in 1949, by which time the three-man Palestine Conciliation
Commission, which the same resolution established, was to submit "de-
tailed proposals" for the Assembly's consideration. The United States
was appointed a member of the Commission, together with France and
Turkey.
By the end of 1948 the United States was going along with the motions
of internationalization while it recognized that the form of territorial in-
ternationalization the original Partition Plan proposed was no longer suit-
able, for two reasons. First, the two states exercising authority in the
divided City were not prepared to surrender control of their sectors; and
second, the United Nations was not an appropriate body to administer an
international ward. The United Nations lacked both the financial and
administrative resources to operate an international enclave, and that
burden inevitably would fall upon the United States. Thus, a more realis-
tic form of internationalization as required. This arrangement, subse-
quently known as "functional internationalization," restricted
international interest to the protection of the Holy Places, while delegat-
ing secular administration to the states actually exercising control there.
For American policymakers, there was nothing sacred about internation-
alization; rather, internationalization was but a tool to serve what was
sacred.
Israel strongly favored a solution to the Jerusalem problem based upon
the principle of functional internationalization, but was never able, even
with the encouragement of the United States, to persuade Jordan to en-
dorse such a regime. Throughout this entire period, it might be noted no
representative of the United States posed the question which, undoubt-
edly, was fundamental to the whole search for an international Jerusalem
28. G.A. Res. 194 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 21 (1948).
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under United Nations auspices: After May 15, did the United Nations
retain any legal right to intervene in the affairs of Jerusalem and assert
authority there? Legal advisers to the British Foreign Ministry reached
the conclusion that the United Nations after May 15, 1948, in fact, had
become functus officio, i.e., lacking any further authority. 29 American
policymakers demonstrated no awareness that their policy on Jerusalem
was open to question. This question, of course, bears on the issue of Jeru-
salem, even after 1948.
29. British Foreign Office document, Nov. 4, 1949. FO 371/75366.
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